This chapter is in the form of responses to five questions sent by the editors concerning *Posthumanist Applied Linguistics* (PENNYCOOK, 2018), its central themes, relations to critical applied linguistics and so on. I have tried to respond as clearly as possible to these questions and to explain how I understand posthumanism and why I think it can be politically, theoretically and practically an important part of any critical applied linguistic project. This paper was written as the coronavirus pandemic was gripping the world, giving us particular reason to reflect on humanity, the non-human, politics and pessimism. We can hope that by the time people are reading this paper, this particular threat will have eased, though the broader political concerns facing us – the rise of neoliberal and xenophobic populism with its destructive instincts towards both people and the planet – will doubtless still be with us.
1. WHAT ROLE DO YOU THINK THAT SCIENCE (CONCEIVED OF BROADLY) AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY CAN PLAY IN PROMOTING SOLIDARITY, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS GLOBALLY, IN LIGHT OF CURRENT NEO-NATIONALIST AND AUTHORITARIAN TRENDS?

I am not very optimistic on this score. Of particular importance here are the changes to the information commons or shared knowledge base (the commons refers to public ownership or use, and has become another gathering point for opposition to the increased privatisation of everything; see PENNYCOOK, 2019). The privatisation or individuation of knowledge and information presents a complex problem for critical work. Populist conservatives promote anti-institutional thinking, suggesting people should mistrust the news, universities, scientists, knowledge in general. Yet critical work has sought in some ways to do something similar – what else was the take-home message of critical discourse analysis other than “don’t trust the news media”? When, for example so-called climate sceptics align themselves with critical analysts (whether critical philosophers of science or critical discourse analysts) on the basis that both are sceptical of claims to “trust the science” or “believe what you read”, we have to start to rethink our relation to “the truth” and “matters of concern” (Latour, 2004). “Post-truth politics”, as Fish (2016) remarks, is characterised by a willingness to issue warnings and make claims and promises for electoral advantage with no clear basis in real or future events. And yet, as critical discourse studies suggest, we need to go further than merely suggesting these are questions of lying for electoral advantage – politicians have been doing this for a long time – and move instead towards an alternative account of truth, ideology, discourse and politics (BLOCK, 2019). It certainly now seems to be the case that politicians are quite content to make openly false claims (and also to deny they just made them) but the real issue is why this has now become possible, what it is now about the fragmentation of knowledge and information sources that makes it so easy for certain knowledge claims to be made.

We live in paradoxical times: on the one hand with mobile devices in hand we can “fact-check” all sorts of statements in seconds; on the other hand, the proliferation of sources of information means that people can make all sorts of knowledge claims that they believe and want others to. To give a very recent example: I have just been discussing responses to the coronavirus in the UK with a senior, highly paid (much more than me) executive who insisted that “80 million
people in the UK are receiving 80 percent of their salary” amongst other claims. When I questioned this (the most obvious problem, among several, being that this is considerably larger than the total UK population), there was no ground given, just a confident insistence that this was correct. The point here is not so much that there has been a viral spread of misinformation about the coronavirus (this is well documented) but that this is part of a much wider network of knowledge sources that means that a range of traditional places of relatively trusted information – newspapers, academics and so on – are no longer trusted as sources of knowledge. Meanwhile these same social media make stars of those who critique “postmodernist neoMarxists” (whatever that grouping is supposed to mean) and “equality of outcome” (supposedly a highly dangerous proposition for the likes of Jordan Peterson – the “intellectual we deserve” (Robinson, 2018)). And we have a complex complicity with this, having for a long time questioned “the truth”, “the media” and so on. The larger point here is that this makes it very hard for academics to promote solidarity, democracy and human rights in light of the rise of authoritarian xenophobic nationalism.

I remain pessimistic on this score, but at the same time we do need ways of doing critical work that offer more than dystopian narratives of the world – through forms of radical hope and struggle for change (HELLER; MCELHINNY, 2017, p. xv). A lot of commentary during the coronavirus pandemic aimed to be critical but seemed more pointlessly negative, arguing that when this was over governments would continue to maintain control, people would communicate digitally rather than face to face, jobs would not be reinstated, teaching would now all be done online, and so on. This, I would argue, was not usefully critical, but rather unhelpfully negative, stirring fear in troubling ways. There are indeed real concerns for the casually employed (now unemployed), for the ways we interact, for the inequalities laid bare by the closure of schools, and these, one could hope, can be addressed both by activism at the time and by continued criticism of the casualisation of the workforce and the inequities of education. This distinction between critical work, which necessarily takes a negative view of many contemporary aspects of society, and dystopian visions that stoke pessimistic interpretations of the future, can be hard to separate but it is an important one.

The idea of “radical hope” derives from Lear’s (2006) reading of Native American Crow leader, Plenty Coups’ articulation of hope in the face of devastating cultural loss with no clear pathway for change: “What makes this hope radical is that it is directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is. Radical hope anticipates a good for which those
who have the hope as yet lack the appropriate concepts with which to understand it” (LEAR, 2006, p. 103). This in turn has inspired Australian Indigenous activist Noel Pearson (2011) to articulate a project of *radical hope* for Indigenous Australians in the face of racism and profound inequalities, a hope that rests on education: “Our hope depends on how serious we become about the education of our people” (2011, p. 16). The point in general is that neither utopian claims that everything is going well, nor dystopian visions that everything is getting worse can provide the core of a critical applied linguistic project (especially since the *applied* element needs to be able to articulate projects for change). But neither should a challenge that we don’t have all the answers hold us back from articulating some form of radical hope for an alternative future. So we live in difficult times where intellectuals are increasingly dismissed as “elite experts” and where academic work is increasingly under threat: the old settlement around academic freedom and intellectual autonomy has been deeply eroded, public money has been cut, and politicians have intervened in research project grants and educational processes (in Australia, Brazil and Hungary, to name only a few). This is not an easy time to hope to influence the world in more democratic and respectful ways. Yet unless we maintain some kind of radical hope – unless we see that just as Paulo Freire could return from exile, so we too may return from our internal exiles – we cannot even begin to formulate an alternative vision for the world.

2. HOW DO YOU DEFINE POST-HUMANISM AND WHAT ARE THE MAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLIED LINGUISTICS?

I have avoided trying to define posthumanism. It’s a broad and diverse domain of work that means a range of different things. Posthumanism is not a theory, or even a coherent set of propositions, but rather a collection of projects that question the centrality of humans in relation to other things on the planet. The central issue, as far as I’m concerned, has been to *interrogate human hubris*: to ask what is missed in the world when humans take themselves so seriously and consider themselves the centre of all that matters. This is to question the ways humanism has privileged the human mind as the source of knowledge and ethics, assumed that humans were masters of their own intentions and desires, and were uniquely capable of asserting agency. Posthumanism takes “humanity’s ontological precariousness” seriously (FULLER, 2011, p. 75), an issue that has become more salient in these current times of the coronavirus pandemic. The version of posthumanism I have found useful developing is neither drawn to a
dystopian antihumanist nihilism that rejects humans and their place in the world, nor is seduced by utopian visions of a transhumanist future in which humans are integrated with machines and technologies and may achieve immortality. Rather, following Bryant (2011), the goal is to unsettle the position of humans as the monarchs of being and to see humans as entangled and implicated in other beings.

Alongside threats posed by human destructiveness, environmental degradation, and diminishing resources, there is a renewed interest in how we relate to animals and the other inhabitants of this planet. What has this process been about of constantly dividing humans from other animals, of emphasizing that human language is so distinct from animal communication that it must have leapt into existence in an unlikely moment of evolutionary extravagance? Why do we police the notion of the human so insistently and carefully? And why have we come to make the distinctions we do between humans and the world around us, not just humans and other animals but humans and objects, that world that surrounds us but which we have so meticulously separated ourselves from? Perhaps it is time to question the boundaries between what is seen as inside and outside, what is assumed to happen within or without our heads, where the boundary is assumed to lie between the body and the rest. From this point of view humans are no longer set apart from the world, distinct, inalienable creatures who control the environment, but part of it, interwoven into this fabric of things. This has had very obvious implications for thought and action in the time of the Anthropocene: how have we got things so wrong that we are standing on the brink of a collapse of the ecosystem of which we are a part?

Posthumanist lines of thinking have major implications for applied linguistics, not only as a broad background against which we need to understand language use in contemporary life – increased flows of people caused by wars, environmental degradation and the continued impoverishment of the majority world – but also in terms of how we understand cognition, context and communication. Once we consider that the only serious way to study language and cognition is ethnographically (HUTCHINS, 1995), and once we start to consider the social, spatial and embodied dimensions of language learning, an understanding of second language development as a distributed process starts to open up a range of new possibilities for thinking about what language learning and teaching are about. Questioning the sensory deprivation experiment that the making of Man as a rational and literate being has entailed, we can open up to the possibility that language learning happens in and around a much wider set of semiotic assemblages (PENNYCOOK, 2017) including touch, smell, taste, things and places. This
has implications for how we think about communication more generally since what is at stake here is neither mutual understanding nor mutual misunderstanding, but rather a series of adjustments, interpretations, connections, affiliations, adaptations, or what we might call \textit{attunements}.

Posthumanist currents of thought have also been circulating in applied linguistics for some time, though not necessarily under that label. There is currently a climate of thought seeking an increased emphasis on space, place, things and their inter-relationships. From studies of place and semiotics, linguistic landscapes, geosemiotics, nexus analysis, and language ecology, to sociocultural theory, sociomaterial approaches to literacy and poststructuralist accounts of repertoire, there has been an expressed desire to expand the semiotic terrain (beyond language more narrowly construed) in relation to material surrounds and space. From the prescient work of Scollon and Scollon (2004) on nexus analysis as a “semiotic ecosystem” (p. 89) where “historical trajectories of people, places, discourse, ideas, and objects come together” (p. 159), to recent work on social semiotics suggesting that “things make people happen,” and that “objects, in and of themselves, have consequences” (KELL, 2015, p. 442), there are many related approaches that may arguably be considered as posthumanist, even if the authors themselves would not necessarily subscribe to such a framework.

Taking on posthumanist thought can also make new connections and lines of thinking possible. Some areas of applied linguistics had become off-limits to those steeped in critical and social theory: Cognition was something of a dirty word since it was so linked to notions of the individual and thought-internal processes that there seemed no possibility of redeeming the idea for a more socially and critically oriented approach to thought. That this internalised approach to cognition became the dominant mode of exploring second language development has greatly hindered the applied linguistic understanding of language learning. To be sure, more social and ecological approaches to language development (LANTOLF; THORNE, 2006) opened up alternative ways of thinking about cognition but it is when we look at issues of extended and distributed cognition (CLARK, 2008; HUTCHINS, 1995), when we consider that the only serious way to study cognition is ethnographically, that a consideration of the social, spatial and embodied dimensions of language learning opens up an understanding of second language development as a distributed process. Posthumanist thought brings a different set of ethical and political concerns to the applied linguistic table, issues to do with human relations to the planet and its other inhabitants.
3. WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IS THE MAIN ARGUMENT IN YOUR BOOK

POSTHUMANIST APPLIED LINGUISTICS?

There are several different arguments in the book, but the two that stand out for me now are on the one hand, how did we end up with this strange version of language that we have inherited from linguistics? And on the other hand, how can we think about this differently through ideas such as assemblages and entanglements? A key theme that emerged for me while writing the book – it wasn’t part of the agenda when I started – was how to unsettle the idea that “language is what defines humanity”. Much of the study of second language development has operated with an understanding of language and mind located firmly in the human head. Sensory (oral or visual) linguistic input comes in, is processed by the cognitive sandwich, and dispatched again as action or output. But once we start to question the version of language that has been constantly proposed as the thing that separates us from the animals (VAN SPLUNDER, 2020) – a rather strange, esoteric, disembodied version of language that was developed in such a way as to exclude the possibility that animals might be capable of related practices – we can start to see it as embodied, embedded, enacted and distributed (STEFFENSEN, 2012).

The idea of entanglements shifts the sociolinguistic focus towards a more profound sense of interconnectedness. This is very different from the sociolinguistic trope of context, with its limited relations between given backgrounds and assumed languages; nor is it constrained by a critical sociolinguistic or discourse analytic insistence that we have to focus on language in relation to power, class, capital, gender, race and other social categories (though all these matter). Rather, by bringing together both old and new materialisms (BENNETT, 2010), by questioning assumed divisions between humans and non-humans, between living and non-living existents (POVINELLI, 2016), a notion of assemblages insists that we think again about how language relates to the world. Toohey et al’s (2015) study of sociomaterial assemblages brings a focus on the complexity of sociolinguistic events to contexts of school literacy and the collaborative production of digital video texts, asking “how human bodies, the physical setup of classrooms, classroom materials (furniture, books, paper, computers, and so on), discourses about teaching and learning, what is considered to be knowledge, school district policies, the curriculum, and so on are entangled with one another, and how they may be moving and changing together” (p. 466). From their point of view, it is by understanding these entanglements, the ways in which all these
things come together at one moment that we can help minority language students to engage with literacy.

Like Kerfoot and Hyltenstam’s (2017) exploration of the entanglements of North/South politics, epistemologies and histories that render some forms of knowledge more legitimate, and thereby more visible, these approaches insist on both a politics of intersectionality and a politics of the material, assembling humans and non-humans, linguistic resources and material existents. Building on these insights, my collaborators and I have sought to understand in a number of contexts – from a Bangladeshi store in Tokyo to English language teaching in the Philippines – how language is entangled with the world. Everyday mundane diversity, we have argued (PENNYCOOK; OTSUJI, 2019), is a multilingual, multimodal and multisensory spatial entanglement. By focusing on assembling artefacts as much as languages or people, we have been trying to open up an alternative way of thinking that focuses not so much on language use in particular contexts – as if languages preexist their instantiation in particular places, having been carried around by people as if by mobile language containers – but rather on the ways in which particular assemblages of objects, linguistic resources and places come together.

The idea of entanglements of English (PENNYCOOK, 2020) draws our attention to the multiple levels and ways in which English is part of social and political relations, from the inequalities of North/South political economies (PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2020) to the ways it is connected to discourses and ideologies of change, modernization, access, and desire. “Any discussion of English as a global language and its socioeducational implications”, Rubdy (2015, p. 43) reminds us, “cannot ignore the fact that far from being a solution to the dismantling of ‘unequal power’ relations in the world, English is in fact often part of the problem” (p. 43). At the same time, a framework of entanglements and assemblages allows us to avoid levels or scales that place the global at the top and work their way down through nations to the local. A scalar approach implies levels of importance that do not match with people’s lives and contingencies (an English-only classroom language policy may be far more important than a regional policy on minority languages). An assemblage approach avoids necessarily favouring one set of social and political relations over another whereby, for example, political economy is seen as more fundamental than, or as determining, classroom materiality. Such a move may appear to problematically equalize inequality – suggesting that all inequalities are the same in a flattened hierarchy – but this is neither the intention nor the outcome of this way of thinking.
4. WHAT POINTS OF CONVERSION AND TENSION DO YOU SEE BETWEEN POSTHUMANIST APPLIED LINGUISTICS AND CRITICAL APPLIED LINGUISTICS?

For me, they are part of the same project. I have always stressed the need to question the terms with which we operate: “We must change the world while constantly reinterpreting it” (SANTOS, 2018, p. viii). The politics I have tried to develop is a renewed focus on a critical applied linguistic commons (PENNYCOOK, 2019). This is not an argument that centres on either humanity as a shared experience (even if this could ground the moral argument for greater equality and shared results) or on the rights of animals and objects as equal participants in society. Rather it is an argument that takes both a modified materialism from political economy and a modified new materialism to make the case for a new way of thinking about our ethical responsibility to each other and the world. This move towards the commons, to consider the planet as a common whole, is far from a return to humanism; this embraces the commons itself as a space and a process. If we invoke the rallying cry that “we’re all in this together” (a phrase so hypocritically invoked by neoliberal leaders to encourage more sacrifice from those already doing it hard), this is not a call just to all humans, but to a more interrelated sense of the planet, the earth, the animals, the things.

The idea of the commons has become a central organizing idea as an alternative to neoliberalism, a form of resistance to capital, and a rallying point for alternative politics and discourses (DARDOT; LAVAL, 2014). The commons provides an alternative in both thought and practice to the expansive private appropriation of the social, cultural and life spheres. Useful here are the ways in which this line of thinking maintains the good in the communal aspects of communism yet rejects the state or totalitarian aspects it often took on, opting instead for more anarchic (properly understood) and local forms of action, and making the climate, space and the environment central to the struggle. The commons, or the common, have become the term for a regime of practices, struggles, institutions and research that open up the possibility of a non-capitalist future. And while many in this diverse field of struggle would not necessarily want to embrace the ideas laid out here under the label of posthumanism, I would argue that in a number of ways they dovetail nicely. When Hardt and Negri (2005, p. 218) argue that new global protests and struggles are “a mobilization of the common that takes the form of an open, distributed network, in which no center exerts control and all nodes express themselves freely”, we are in many ways
looking at similar ways in which distributed networks, agency, language and cognition can be brought together towards a greater politics.

The politics of the commons takes place as a “spatial response” to processes of enclosure, a “political idiom that evokes the collective production and claiming of conceptual and physical space” (DAWNEY; KIRWAN; BRIGSTOCKE, 2016, p. 13). Akin in a number of ways to the “place-based activism” of Larsen and Johnson (2016, p. 150), where the agency of place “leads to a different understanding of the geographical self – to a more-than-human geographical self”, these approaches to place and activism shift the grounds on which we think our politics. Rather than focusing on more traditional questions of citizenship or social justice, there is a return here to alternative anarchist roots, drawing on a range of thinkers from Mikhail Bakunin or Ivan Illich to the “postanarchist” thought of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler (DAY, 2005; KUHN, 2009). In rethinking these politics we can therefore consider other forms of social organization, whose horizontal structures resemble the horizontal relations I have been proposing for how we think about material relations. From a posthumanist applied linguistic commons point of view, there are several ways we can start to think about our work. A number of writers from an eco-feminist position have argued for the inseparability of feminist, anti-capitalist, anti-racist politics and a focus on animals and the environment (ADAMS; GRUEN, 2014).

A rethinking of the relationship to all those Others that suffered in the construction of humanity – gods, machines, objects, things, animals, monsters, women, slaves, and so on (HARAWAY, 2008) – has important implications for any project in critical language studies. This “qualitative shift in our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet” (BRAIDOTTI, 2013, p. 1-2), this “reordering of social identity as a reciprocal exchange between thinking bodies, machines and environments” (AMIN, 2015, p. 245), presents diverse consequences for critical language projects, in particular different language-ecological ways of thinking about the relation between language and the non-human (APPLEBY; PENNYCOOK, 2017). A rethinking of the relationship to all those Others that suffered in the construction of humanity, and a shift in our thinking about what constitutes the basic unit of reference for humans and our relationship to other carbon-based and non-carbon-based inhabitants of this planet, has important implications for any project in critical applied linguistics. For a start, we can strengthen our resistance to the pull of humanist assumptions, questioning those forms
of pedagogy and research that assume humans at the centre of the world, that language learning happens only in our heads, that literacy is a matter only of textual decoding, that agency is something that only humans have, that the world revolves around the human subject.

5. HOW HAS THE POST-HUMANIST VISION OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS CONTRIBUTED TO CURRENT STRUGGLES FOR A FAIRER, MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY FOR ALL? WHAT ARE THE MAIN OUTSTANDING CHALLENGES?

The question of how to understand posthumanism politically is not always self-evident. Isn’t this just a philosophical movement questioning the role of humanity in relation to the environment? To question the politics of such a stance, however, is already to take a limited view of what is at stake here. The avowedly anti-humanist stance taken by some is linked to the ways the notion of humanity has always been exclusionary. Why, as a woman, asks Braidotti (2013, p. 16), would she want to be a member of a category (human) that has been so consistently exclusionary: “I am none too fond of Humanism or of the idea of the human which it implicitly upholds.” Humanism generally assumes a fixed universal commonality for all humans, and as many critics of this position have remarked, this position was all too often Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) (HENRICH; HEINE; NORENZAYAN, 2010). We might add White, Male and Straight to that list. For Braidotti, this anti-humanism “consists of de-linking the human agent from this universalistic posture, calling him to task, so to speak, on the concrete actions he is enacting” (2013, p. 23).

From a feminist anti-humanist point of view, the issue is not to seek entry into the exclusive category of the human but rather to seek to unravel an idea that has never been as open as it claims. Likewise the question of race: “Euro-American discourse on man depends on the two central figures of Blackness and race” (MBEMBE, 2017, p. 6). That is to say, the very notion of the human (or “man” as he was known) developed as both raced and gendered: “Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, Blackness and race have constituted the (unacknowledged and often denied) foundation […] from which the modern project of knowledge – and of governance – has been deployed” (2017, p. 2). To try to undo this humanism, not so much by asking for inclusion into the folds of the fully human, but rather by questioning its foundations and assumptions, is a far more radical critical project than those that seek simply forms of social justice. Indeed
social justice itself – what Mills (2017) calls “racial liberalism” – has always, amongst other things, been colour blind, since “whites do not recognize their privileging as privileging, as differential and unfair treatment” (p. 47). With its deep emphasis on the individual and lack of concern with groups based around class, race or gender – “taking a propertied white male standpoint as given” – “modern mainstream Anglo-American epistemology was for hundreds of years from its Cartesian origins profoundly inimical terrain for the development of any concept of structural group-based miscognition” (MILLS, 2017, p. 49). The inability to deal with race in any meaningful way “is structural and symptomatic of white political philosophy in general” (p. 147)

By opening up “a broader perspective on the contingency of language and its entanglements” (BECK, 2018, p. 1) – showing how language is entangled with social, cultural, political and economic relations – it is possible not to favour one over the other, not to suggest that class matters a priori more than race or gender, economy more than health, materiality more than discourse. In these local assemblages, certain things do of course matter more than others – modes of inequality are not equal – but the point is not to operate with a predefined hierarchy of inequality. This is not to replace the old materialism with the new but to see that forms of materialism (socioeconomic infrastructure) shouldn’t have a monopoly on material relations. Inequalities have to be understood in relation to each other. Although at times a focus on assemblages may appear to lead to flattened hierarchies and ontologies, it is, by contrast, intended as a way of understanding and engaging with contemporary political relations: “The logic of assemblage” Hardt and Negri (2017, p. 295) assert, “integrates material and immaterial machines, as well as nature and other nonhuman entities, into cooperative subjectivities. An enriched freedom of assembly generates the subjective assemblages that can animate a new world of cooperative networks and social production”.

This approach allows for an alternative in terms of the politics of assembly and a more intertwined set of policies, practices and discourses that occur across multiple spatiotemporal domains. New materialist approaches follow a line of thought running from Spinoza to Deleuze rather than Hegel to Marx, suggesting an alternative politics centred less on material infrastructure, political economy and the demystification projects of ideology critique (which reduce political agency to human agency) and instead on a politics that reorients humans towards their ethical interdependence with the material world (BENNETT, 2010). A language such as English is enmeshed within local modes of distribution, and all
the inclusions, exclusions, and inequalities this may entail. It is bound up with changing modes of communication and forms of popular culture. It is entrenched in educational systems, bringing to the fore many concerns about knowledge, pedagogy and the curriculum. Drawing on insights from Southern Applied Linguistics (PENNYCOOK; MAKONI, 2020) an account of how languages such as English can be understood in relation to local and global entanglements, suggests that a redistributive project (BLOCK, 2018) need not be limited to, or be dependent on, the redistribution of traditionally material goods, but can also include the redistribution of linguistic resources, agentive actions, cognitive processes and forms of identity.

A focus on entanglements and assemblages, therefore, does not eschew old materialism for either new materialism or discourse, but rather seeks an understanding of their interrelationship. In order to engage with the entanglements of a language such as English, neither the utopian logics of world Englishes and English as a lingua franca, nor the dystopian logics of linguistic imperialism, will get us very far. A focus on English entanglements sheds light on how being “part of the problem” is about the interconnectedness between language, place, power, objects, class, race, gender, and more. To create a new post-neoliberal society, and a new post-*homo economicus* subjectivity, therefore, we need to be able to imagine “new subjectivities that operate increasingly according to a *logic of assemblage*, defined no longer by their possessions but by their connections.” (HARDT; NEGRI, 2017, p. 295; emphasis added). This is to see how English and other languages are entangled in everyday, simultaneous activities and material encounters, and how a project of radical redistribution may concern not only political economy but also assemblages of linguistic resources, identifications, artefacts and places.

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