Five challenges for theories of law

Lima, Flávio

Resumo:

In this paper, I introduce five intuitive challenges that should be dealt with by theories of law. Then, I argue that the typically positivist idea that the legal ascriptions of a given legal system may be grounded exclusively in descriptive facts seems to conflict with three of these challenges. I conclude that, in spite of the fact that both interpretivism and descriptivism are counterintuitive theories about law, it is the latter that has a greater argumentative burden.

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DOI: 10.5151/9786555502688-06

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Como citar:

Lima, Flávio; "Five challenges for theories of law", p. 143-158. PósDebate: 10 anos: grupo de debates da pós-graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP. São Paulo: Blucher, 2025.
ISBN: 9786555502688, DOI 10.5151/9786555502688-06