Value Judgments, Incommensurability, and Rationality: Moral Philosophy vs. Economics

Sardo, Alessio

Resumo:

The interesting essay by Gustavo Lucredi, entitled ‘A comparabilidade do intrínseco e do superior: escolhendo entre bens incomensuráveis’, invites us to reconsider the philosophical debate on incommensurability, which was in the spotlight in the 1990s and early 2000s. Lucredi is certainly correct in assuming that rational choice involves a ranking of preferences, based on a comparative evaluation of alternative options. He is also right to emphasize that someone faced with difficult choices – for example, whether we should restrict individual liberties in order to preserve national security – might perceive that heterogeneous and irreducible values are at play. This intuition is precisely what the notion of incommensurability captures. Moral philosopher who postulate the existence of ‘intrinsic values’ have developed several explanations for incommensurability. Lucredi, on the other hand, argues that the concept of incommensurability should be abandoned in favor of the opposite view: options are always comparable. I concur with Lucredi. In this brief commentary, I will add fuel to the fire, by arguing against incommensurability from a microeconomic perspective (see e.g., ACEMOGLU et al. 2016), which is different but consistent with Lucredi’s argument. In my view, the perception of “incommensurability” is caused by biases and framing effects, and moral philosophers such as Joseph Raz and Ruth Chang have failed to offer a convincing theory of choice.

Download (PDF)

102 downloads

DOI: 10.5151/9786555502688-02-comentario

Referências bibliográficas
  • ACEMOGLU, Daron, LAIBSON, David & LIST, John A., 2016. Microeconomics. Harlow (UK): Pearson Education Limited.
  • ANDERSON, Elizabeth, 1997. “Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods”. In: Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press: 90-109.
  • BARBERIS, Mauro, 2007. Etica Per Giuristi. Roma/Bari: Laterza.
  • CANALE, D., CIUNI, R., FRIGERIO, A. & TUZET, G., 2021. Critical Thinking. An Introduction. Milano: Egea.
  • CHANG, Ruth, 1997. “Introduction.” In: Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press: 1-34.
  • JOHNSON, Eric J. & GOLDSTEIN, Daniel D., 2003. “Do Defaults Save Lives?”. In: 302 Science: 1338-1339.
  • DEBREU, Gerard, 1959. Theory of Value. New York (NY): John Wiley and Sons.
  • HARSANYI, John C., 1958. “Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives.” In: 47 Mind: 305-316.
  • HICKS, John R., 1939. Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • KAHNEMAN, Daniel, SLOVIC, Paul & TVERSKY, Amos, 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • KEKES, John, 1993. The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
  • KELLER, Punam A., HARLAM, Bari, LOEWENSTEIN, George & VOLPP, Kevin G., 2011. “Enhanced Active Choice: A New Method to Motivate Behavior Change.” In: 21(4) Journal of Consumer Psychology: 376-383.
  • LUCE, Duncan & RAIFFA, Howard, 1957. Games and Decisions. New York (NY): John Wiley & Sons.
  • SIMON, Herb A., 1960. The New Science of Management Decision. New York (NY): Harper.
  • SOMAN, Dilip, 2001. “Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behavior: The Role of Rehearsal and Immediacy of Payments.” In: 27(4) Journal of Consumer Research: 460-474.
  • SOMAN, Dilip, 2010. “Option Overload: Dealing with Choice Complexity.” In: Fall 2010 Rotman Magazine: 43-47.
  • RAZ, Joseph, 1988. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • THALER, Richard A. & SUNSTEIN, Cass, 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press.
  • TETLOCK, Philip E. & GARDNER, Dan, 2015. Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. New York: Crown Publishers.
  • VON WRIGHT, George H., 2000. “Valuations – Or How to Say the Unsayable.” In: 13 Ratio Juris: 347-357.
  • WEST, Patricia M., BROWN, Christina L. & HOCH, Stephen J., 1996. “Consumption Vocabulary and Preference Formation.” In: 23(2) Journal of Consumer Research: 120-135.
  • WILLIAMS, Bernard, 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Como citar:

SARDO, Alessio; "Value Judgments, Incommensurability, and Rationality: Moral Philosophy vs. Economics", p. 66-76. PósDebate: 10 anos: grupo de debates da pós-graduação da Faculdade de Direito da USP. São Paulo: Blucher, 2025.
ISBN: 9786555502688, DOI 10.5151/9786555502688-02-comentario